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REEXAMINATION OF THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
THOMAS E. ATKI-sON*
Almost thirty years ago, at the conclusion of a study of the pleading
and procedural aspects of the statute of limitations,' the writer set forth
a brief summary of his position as follows:
1. The New York method of asserting the bar of the statute of
limitations by motion at a preliminary stage of the action is the most
efficient method yet to appear.
2. As a first alternative to the above, the demurrer, preferably the
special demurrer, should be permitted to raise the point in all possible
cases. To this end the plaintiff should -be obliged to bring himself within
any exception upon which he relies, either in the original or amended
complaint.
3. In the cases in which the foregoing devices cannot be used and
generally in the jurisdictions which refuse to use them, the bar of the
statute should be raised specially in the plea or answer.
4. A defendant should not be permitted to raise the defense of
limitation of time under the general issue or general denial. This would
seem desirable even in those cases in which he relies upon title by adverse
possession or a special limitation of a statutory action. All time limitations
should have as far as possible the same procedural treatment.
5. It seems sound to consider that the defense is waived unless pre-
sented by one of the first three above alternative means. Amendments
asserting the defense at a late stage of the proceeding should be allowed
only under special circumstances.2
Revisiting the subject in 1955 involves something more than putting
one's attention to the specific developments of the last three decades.
Initially the difference in the procedural climate of the 1920's and the
195 0 's must be noticed. Of course the Federal Rules, with their emphasis
upon simplicity and efficiency in the progress of the lawsuit without
throwing overboard all of the procedural tradition accumulated over the
centuries, are the chief factors in this change. They have marked a new
era in the field of adjective law, not only in the federal courts but in the
several state jurisdictions where identical or similar rules have been
adopted. It is with a sense of satisfaction that the writer observes that the
Federal Rules and the state procedures which have followed the Rules
* Professor of Law, New York University, School of Law.
14llegations of Time in Pleading, 35 YALE L.J. 487 (1926); Some Procedural
Aspects of the Statute of Limitations, 27 COLUM. L. Ray. (1927); Pleading the
Statute of Limitations, 36 YALE L.J. 914 (1927). The last article is hereafter cited
as Pleading.
2 Pleading, supra note 1, at 948.
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have adopted most of his specific propositions relative to the pleading
of time limitations.3
Another important procedural development in the present connection
is the adoption and utilization of summary judgment procedures in the
federal and state systems. Summary judgment, in its infancy in America
at the time of the earlier articles, has now become a significant part of the
speeding up of the administration of justice.4 That it has marked perti-
nency in the raising of the defense of the statute of limitations will be
immediately apparent.'
More general and more unmeasurable than either of these two
considerations is the fact that in recent years the bench and bar have been
less inclined to be technical in matters of procedure-particularly in
pleading. Quite independent of specific changes in procedural devices,
there is a somewhat different professional attitude toward the adjective
law. It is a common sense point of view' which tends to move the focus
closer to the goals for which the writer, among many others, expressed
desire and hope.
Since the problems connected with adverse possession and with time
limitations fixed by the very statute which creates the right present special
problems, it is proposed to treat them separately after the various pro-
cedural aspects of the general statute of limitations have been discussed.
THE GENERAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
(1) Allegations of Time
Specification of when the events took place is a natural and almost
inevitable part of any form of the narrative process. Even the fairy
stories begin: "Once upon a time." While no paraphrase of the mandate
of Stephen7 that "the pleadings must allege the tmre; that is, the day,
month, and year when each traversable fact occurred" can be found in
the Federal Rules, the Rules do contemplate time allegations? and the
forms appended to the Rules show this by way of example.' Even if the
Rules were deemed to authorize the type of notice-pleading which does
not require allegation of the elements of the claim, the relevant dates
would be a part of the necessary minimum statement."0
Despite the fact that under the present federal procedure information
to supplement the complaint can usually be obtained only through the
3 See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1937 (hereafter cited as FED. R.
Cwr. P.) 8(c), 9(f) and infra text at notes 8-10, 34-39, 43-45, 64.
4 See VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 219-220
(1949).
5 See infra text at note 45 and following.
6 See e.g. Hitchcock v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 134 Conn. 246, 56 A.2d
655 (1947).
7 STEPHEN, PLEADING (Tyler ed. 1898).
8 See FED. RI. Civ. P. 9(f); Rich v. Kehler and Ingalzo, 47 Sch. L.R. 168
(Pa. C.P. 1950) applying a state court rule.
9 In particular, see Forms 3, 6 to 18.
10 See Whittier, Notice Pleading, 31 HARv. L. REv. 501, 502-505 (1918).
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discovery process, the courts have shown a willingness to require more
particularization of the pleadings when there is a deficiency of time
allegations.1 1 A similar attitude is manifest in recent state cases.1" While
day, month and year is the normal requirement of specificity, "on or
about" is sometimes permissible,13 although some decisions require state-
ment of the hour as well as the date.14 These departures from the rule
of thumb are not indications of either laxity or strictness of the court, but
simply show that less or greater particularity is reasonable in the circum-
stances of the particular case.
Time allegations serve principally a notice-giving function. In most
cases time is "immaterial" and issue cannot be taken thereon.' 5 Proof of
a different date from the one alleged is not normally a fatal variance,
16
L1 Klein v. Debway Hats, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 356 (S.D. N.Y. 1942); Downey v.
Banker, 1 F.R.D. 123 (S.D. N.Y. 1940) (bill of particulars); Forstmann v. Wenner-
Gren, 1 FJLD. 775 (S.D. N.Y. 1941); see also notes 14, 19 infra. But cf. Clark
Door Co. v. Yeager, 1 F.R.D. 770 (M.D. Pa. 1941).
12 Industrial Say. Bank v. Greenwald, 229 Ala. 529, 158 So. 734 (1935);
Owings v. Dayhoff, 159 Md. 403, 151 At. 240 (1930); McKay v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 142 Me. 296, 50 A.2d 914 (1947) (special demurrer) ; cf. Tilden Lumber
& Mill Co. v. Bacon Land Co., 116 Cal. App. 689, 3 P.2d 350 (1931) (note set
forth in pleading adequately showed maturity date); Tiller v. Cincinnati Discount
Co., 270 Ky. 685, 110 S.W. 2d 420 (1937) (usury-discovery) ; Hunt v. National
Linen Service Corporation, 178 Tenn. 262, 157 S.W. 2d 608 (1941); Miller v.
Brown, 107 Cal. App. 2d 304, 237 P.2d 320 (1951) (special demurrer sustained for
uncertainty of time).
13 Parker'v. Transcontinental & Western Air, 4 F.R.D. 325 (W.D. Mo. 1944);
Handschumaker v. Belan, 12 Fay. L.J. 34 (Pa. C.P. 1949); Meyers v. Price, 247
S.W. 2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); see also Phillips v. Ashworth, 220 Ala. 237,
124 So. 519 (1929) (seduction in "summer or fall of 1926," sufficient) ; Scott v.
City of Marshall, 223 Mo. App. 596, 14 S.W. 2d 694 (1929) (flooding at given
date and other numerous times, sufficient); Vanderhoef v. Parker Bros. Co., 267
Mich. 672, 255 N.W. 449 (1934) (services rendered between specified dates, suffi-
cient). Cf. Greninger v. Fischer, 81 Cal. App. 2d 549, 184 P.2d 694 (1947) ("on or
about" allegation prevented possible disposition of the case upon demurrer).
14 Guerin v. Portland Trawling Co., 1 F.R.D. 64 (D. Mass. 1939); Missouri
Pac. R. Co. v. Berry, 180 Ark. 437, 21 S.W. 2d 601 (1929) (dog killed about 11
o'clock in the forenoon, sufficient).
15 See cases holding that a literal denial of an allegation that an act was
done on a certain day is a negative pregnant and amounts to an admission that
it was done on another day. Hess v. Sausser, 206 Cal. 15, 272 Pac. 1059 (1928) ;
Williams v. Kosek, 33 Luzerne Leg. Reg. Repts. 242 (Pa. C.P. 1939); see also
Fagerstrom v. Rappaport, 176 Minn. 254, 223 N.W. 142 (1929).
16 Swedman v. Standard Oil Co., 12 La. App. 359, 125 So. 481 (1929) ; Horton
v. Industrial Commission, 88 Utah 306, 54 P. 2d 249 (1936) ; Rygiel v. Kanengieser,
114 N.J.L. 311, 176 At. 605 (1935) (although no videlicit). See also Independent
Life Ins. Co. v. Vann, 24 Ala. App. 72, 130 So. 520 (1930) (if there is a videlicit) ;
Cable v. United States, 104 F. 2d 541 (7th Cir. 1939) (same-Illinois law-limited
to proof of date within limitation period) ; Hitchcock v. Union & New Haven Trust
Co., 134 Conn. 246, 56 A. 2d 655 (1947) ; Atchley v. Wood, 255 Ala. 227, 51 So. 2d
705 (1951) ("on or about"). Variance between dates of adultery alleged and proved
was deemed cured by amendment to conform with proofs in Collins v. Collins,
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although a recent Alabama case harks back to earlier days by limiting this
to cases where the time was alleged under a videlicit." Traits of honesty
and accuracy at the bar will usually result in a statement of the true dates;
the slippery or the careless pleader may be penalized by the imposition of
costs of a continuance if the opponent is surprised at the trial.' s
The requirement of time allegations applies to all cases, while only
a small percentage involves any contention that the statute of limitations
has run. Hence it is not likely that the requirement has been much
motivated by the desire to facilitate disposition of litigation upon the
ground of limitations. It is perhaps more accurate to say that pretrial
disposition of limitation cases is a by-product of the time allegation rule.
1 9
But it is an important by-product since the time allegation in the complaint
is a sine quo non of raising the statute of limitations by the demurrer or
the demurrer-type motion, and it is of considerable, though less, impor-
tance in connection with employment of summary judgment or speaking
motion procedures to dispose of cases on the ground that the action is
barred by lapse of time.
(2) Demurrer
When the plaintiff's initial pleading shows -that his cause of action
accrued beyond the applicable limitation period, should it be demurrable?
Objections to raising the statute of limitations by demurrer have been
three in number.20 One is that the 'bar will not appear for purposes of a
demurrer since the date of the commencement of the action is not apparent
on the face of the plaintiff's pleading. This is a highly technical viewpoint.
In states in which an action is commenced by the filing of the complaint
the date of commencement appears from the official file mark on the
back; in any case a court should take judicial notice of the date of com-
mencement in the very action. A recent West Virginia case shows that
this objection may be overcome by granting oyer of the writ upon request
of the demurring defendant.2 '
235 Mich. 315, 209 N.W. 58 (1926); see also Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Downey,
255 Ky. 95, 72 S.W. 2d 1008 (1934) (error to refuse amendment to conform with
proof of date).
17 Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. Latham, 255 Ala. 160, 50 So. 2d
727 (1951) ; see note 13. supra.
18 Note, 35 YALE L.J. 487, 494 (1926).
19 But cf. Frederick 0. Muller Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 4 F.R. Serv. 169
(S.D. N.Y. 1940) where motion to make more definite was sustained to an
allegation of publication of libel on a certain date "and at various other times"
when the specified date was beyond' the statutory period; and see Miller v. Brown,
107 Cal. App. 2d 304, 237 P. 2d 320 (1951).
2 0 Pleading, supra note 1, at 919-922.
21 Town of Clendenin v. Ledsome, 129 W.Va. 388, 40 S.E. 2d 849 (1946)
(statutory action but time limitation contained exceptions). Cf. Goldschmidt v.
Pevely Dairy Co., 341 Mo. 982, 111 S.W. 2d 1 (1937) (may look to filing date
on complaint). But see Howard v. Waale-Complan & Tiberti, 67 Nev. 304, 217
P. 2d 872 (1950).
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The second objection is that allegations of time are "immaterial"
and hence they are not sufficiently established or admitted to test the
matter of bar on the demurrer. This again is a misapplied technicality.
Allegations of time are said to be immaterial in order to permit proof of
a date other than that alleged without a fatal variance. 2 When the plain-
tiff pleads a date of accrual of his claim and persists in that allegation,
it is fair to take him at his word in passing on his right to recover. This
is the philosophy of Federal Rule 9 (f): "For the purpose of testing the
sufficiency of a pleading, averments of time and place are material and
shall be considered like all other averments of material matter."23 A late
Connecticut decision expresses the same philosophy.
2 4
The only substantial objection to raising the matter by demurrer is
that the practice may prevent a plaintiff from showing that his case comes
within some exception of the statute of limitation such as absence, in-
capacity, or concealment. This reason prompted the orthodox common
law position that the point could not be raised by demurrer, at least when
there was any possibility of exceptions. On the other hand the equity
pleaders took the position that an apparently barred complainant must
state the facts constituting exceptions to the statute in his original or
amended bill; if he did not, a demurrer would be sustained when the
pleading showed that the normal statutory period had elapsed.
Some code states follow the common law position,25 others the
equity view.26 The matter is complicated by express statutory provisions
in a number of the code jurisdictions. When there is express enumeration
of the statute as a ground of demurrer there seems to be no alternative
other than the equity position.27 On the other hand some codes provide
that the bar is waived unless pleaded in the answer. This has been thought
22 Note, 35 YALE L.J. 487, 489 (1926).
23 See notes 35-37 infra and accompanying text.
24 Hitchcock v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 134 Conn. 246, 56 A. 2d 655
(1947). But see Quaker City Choc. & Con. Co. v. Delhi-Warnock Bldg. Ass'n,
357 Pa. 307, 53 A. 2d 597 (1947).25 Keilman v. City of Hammond, 116 N.E. 2d 515 (Ind. App. 1953) ; Batchelor
v. Mitchell, 238 N.C. 351, 78 S.E. 2d 240 (1953); Woolery v. Smith, 302 Ky. 725,
196 S.W. 2d 115 (1946).
26 Horrigan v. Quinlan, 149 Neb. 538, 31 NAV. 2d 430 (1948); Johanson v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114, 152 P. 2d 98 (1944). But a complaint that
merely shows that the action may be barred is not demurrable. Vassere v. Joerger
10 Cal. 2d 689, 76 P. 2d 656 (1938); cf. Note, 29 MICH. L Rtv. 523 (1931) ; see
also Nevada-Douglas Consolidated C. Co. v. Berryhill, 58 Nev. 261, 75 P. 2d 992
(1.938) where the complaint showed that the defendant was a foreign corporation
to whom the statute did not apply unless it had a resident agent; Eastern Out-
fitting Co. v. Lamb, 169 Wash. 480, 14 P. 2d 30 (1932) (error to refuse amendment
to complaint after demurrer).
27 Price v. Kobacker Furniture Co., 25 Ohio App. 44, 158 N.E. 551 (1927);
Bergmann v. Puhl, 195 Wis. 120, 217 N.W. 746 (1928).
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by some courts to forbid the matter from being raised by demurrer,28
although a more reasonable meaning attributable to such provisions is
that they merely prevent the defendant from taking advantage of the
bar under an answer which does not specifically raise the defense.
29
Where the statutory grounds of demurrer include time limitations
it is normal to hold that the demurrer must be special and point out the
particular limitation relied upon. 0 When the demurrer is sustained upon
the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action if the
complaint discloses the bar, it is usual to find that the demurrer need
state only that general ground,31 although California persists in the
anomalous position that the demurrer must designate the grounds of
limitation as an added specification of -the statutory ground of failure to
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
32
In the demurrer states there has been little change in judicial attitude
on the problem of whether the matter can be raised upon demurrer.
Several scores of opinions have passed on the question, but few of them
contain discussion of any consequence or of any new attitude. However,
Connecticut may be receding from its position that the point cannot be
raised by demurrer.
3 3
(3) Motion
The writer's recommendation that the pre-trial motion be accepted
as a device for raising the bar of the statute of limitations3 4 has received
an enormous impetus from the Federal Rules. Motions based upon ob-
jections appearing on the face of the pleadings do not differ fundamentally
from the demurrer, although the motion procedure should be freer from
technicality than the common law machinery which it supplants. A
number of early trial court decisions under the Federal Rules 'held that
the demurrer-type motion could not be employed to raise the defense,
since Rule 8 (c) lists the statute of limitations as one of the defenses
2 8 Lewis v. Shaver, 236 N.C. 510, 73 S.E. 2d 320 (1952); Bielenberg v.
Higgins, 85 Mont. 56, 277 Pac. 631 (1929).
29 See text at notes 34-37, 57-62 infra.
30 Ricker v. Ricker, 201 Ore., 416, 270 P. 2d 150 (1954) (recognizing general
rule, but holding general demurrer sufficient in case of personal representative who
was not permitted to waive the bar).
31 Bradley v. Hall, 165 Kan. 358, 194 P. 2d 943 t1948) ; Howard v. Jeffrey,
268 P. 2d 897 (Okla. 1954).
32 See Ryan v. Welte, 87 Cal. App. 2d 897, 198 P. 2d 357 (1948) for the
strictness with which the rule is applied. However, the demurrer need not, as in
case of the answer, specify the subdivision of the statute relied upon as a bar.
Bainbridge v. Stoner, 16 Cal. 2d 423, 106 P. 2d 423 (1940); see also Note, 29
CALIF. L. REv. 210, 213-215 (1941).
S3 Hitchcock v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 134 Conn. 246, 56 A. 2d 655
(1947), note 16 supra, declares that a demurrer raises the point if the plaintiff
joins in the demurrer; the earlier Connecticut cases indicated that the demurrer
could never raise the general statute of limitations by demurrer. See also Board-
man v. Burlingame, 123 Conn. 646, 197 At. 761 (1938).
34 Pleading, supra note 1, at 929-933, 948.
[Vol. 16
1955] REEXAMINATION OF PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 163
which must be pleaded in the answer.Y5 The mechanical argument is that
since the defense must be pleaded it cannot be raised by motion to dismiss.
This view point can now be regarded as thoroughly exploded, since there
is higher authority in at least six circuits to the effect that Federal Rule
9 (f) 3" distinctly indicates that the timeliness of the action can be tested
upon the basis of the pleading and that the motion to dismiss under Rule
12 upon the ground of "failure to state a claim" is an appropriate pro-
ceeding in which the matter can be raised.3" While it is not clear whether
the motion must expressly mention the ground of the statute of limita-
tions,38 the better view would seem to make this a requirement, especially
in view of Federal Rule 7 (b) (1) which provides that motions "shall
state with particularity the grounds therefor."
39
In Delaware4" and Missouri, 4 under provisions like those of the
Federal Rules, it has been held that a motion to dismiss may be sustained
when the plaintiff's pleading shows that the period fixed by the statute of
limitations has elapsed. Unfortunately the highest courts of two other
states have held to the contrary upon the same ground that motivated the
early federal district court cases.42 Several other state courts have held
that the motion to dismiss, apparently of the demurrer type, is a proper
means of raising the objection.43  In 1944 New York amended Civil
3r, E.g. Baker v. Sisk, 1 F.R.D. 232 (E.D. Okla. 1938) ; Kraushaar v. Leschin,
4 F.R.D. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
30 Set forth at note 23 supra.
37 Kincheloe v. Farmer, 214 F. 2d 604 (7th Cir. 1954); Taylor v. Houston,
211 F. 2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax Con-
solidated, 185 F. 2d 196 (9th Cir. 1950); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v.
Parish, 168 F. 2d 238 (10th Cir. 1948); Brictson v. Woodrough, 164 F. 2d 107
(8th Cir. 1947). See text at note 29 supra. See also Continental Colliers v. Shober,
130 F. 2d 631, 635 (3rd Cir. 1942).
38 In Federal Rules Form 19(1) the motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a claim makes no specification of the reason for the failure.
39 See 3 F.R. Serv. 671 (1940) ; Steingut v. National City Bank of New York,
36 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. N.Y. 1941) (motion to remand).
40 Patterson v. Vincent, 61 A. 2d 416 (Del. Super. Ct. 1948); see also Feil v.
Senisi, 7 N.J.L. 517, 72 A. 2d 348 (Super. Ct. 1950).
41 Granger v. Barber, 361 Mo. 716, 236 S.W. 2d 293 (1951); Bruun v. Katz
Drug Co., 359 Mo. 334, 221 S.V. 2d 717 (1949); Devault v. Truman, 354 Mo. 1193,
194 SA. 2d 29 (1946) ; see Baysinger v. Hanser, 355 Mo. 1042, 199 S.W. 2d 644
(1947).
42 Smith v. Kent Oil Co., 128 Colo. 80, 261 P. 2d 149 (1953); Proctor v.
Schomberg, 63 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1953); Akin v. City of Miami, 65 So. 2d 54 (Fla.
1953). See text at note 35 supra. The Florida decisions are retrogressive since the
defense could be raised by demurrer under the earlier practice. Dee v. Southern
Brewing Co., 146 Fla. 588, 1 So. 2d 562 (1941).
43 Wilson v. Tromly, 401 11. 307, 89 N.E. 2d 22 (1949) (death action) ; Harris
v. Norwalk Trucking Co., 334 Il. App. 82, 78 N.E. 2d 343 (1948) (personal
injury); Collins v. Richardson, 168 Kan. 203, 212 P. 2d 302 (1949) (motion to
strike); Yeager v. Mellus, 328 Mich. 243, 43 N.W. 2d 836 (1950). But see
Thomas v. McLean, 365 Pa. 526, 76 A. 2d 413 (1950).
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Practice Act Rule 107 so as to make it clear that a motion to dismiss is
proper when the complaint discloses the bar. This change was necessary
to remove the possibility, under the peculiar structure of Rules 106 and
107, that, while a motion supported by affidavit might theretofore raise
the objection at the pretrial stage when the objection did not appear on
the face of the complaint, the matter could be raised only by answer if
the complaint disclosed that the action was barred.44 Although the argu-
ment seems absurd there was adequate basis for it under the lex scrtae
of New York prior to 1944.
While there are technical differences in obtaining judgment under
the speaking motion and under the motion for summary judgment, there
is no difference in end result. The substantial identity of these two pro-
cedures is demonstrated 'by the 1946 amendment to Federal Rule 12(b),
declaring that when matters outside the pleadings are presented upon
motion to dismiss and not excluded 'by the 'court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment.45 To warrant the grant of judg-
ment on pretrial motion upon grounds not appearing in the opponent's
pleading, it is necessary that the grounds appear "without substantial con-
troversy."346 Typically the motion is based upon the moving party's
affidavits which are not adequately answered by the opponent, although
under Federal Rule 56(a) pleadings, depositions and admissions on file
may also be considered, and the use of testimony is not forbidden.
Of course motion for summary judgment should n6t be granted if
there is a material issue of fact with regard to the ground of the motion.
While statistical data are lacking, there is reason to believe that in the
majority of cases there is no real dispute of fact as to the existence of the
bar, and that the only question is whether the defendant chooses to raise
the defense and has done so in the proper manner. The relevant fact
matters are often established by record,4" or are such that do not permit
real dispute. Serious controversies sometimes arise out of questions of law,
such as what section of the statute applies to the case,4 s the manner of
computation of the period,49 and the applicability of exceptions to the
plaintiff's case. Questions of law-even serious questions--can be deter-
mined upon motion for summary judgment. It is a mistake to believe
that the court's decision on the motion must -be hurried; indeed legal
problems may receive more detached consideration at the motion stage
than if the point must be decided in the hurry of the trial.
44 See Tenth Annual Report, Judicial Council of New York 320-322 (1944).
45 Cf. Butcher v. United Electric Coal Co., 174- F. 2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1949);
Latta v. Western Inv. Co., 173 F. 2d 99 (9th Cir. 1949); CLARK, CODE PLEADING
542-545 (1947).
46 FED. R. CIR. P. 56 (d) ; cf. N.Y. Rules of Civil Practice, Rule 113.
47 See First Nat. Bank v. American Surety Co., 239 App. Div. 282, 267 N.Y.
Supp. 565 (1933) (summons).
4 8 Kraushaar v. Leschin, 4 F.R.D. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
49 See annotation, 20 A.L.R. 2d 1249 (1951).
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In by far the majority of federal appellate cases wherein summary
judgment was granted below on the ground of limitations, the decision
was affirmed.5" The paucity of state decisions,5 ' except in New York,52
may be due in part to the fact that in many jurisdictions summary judg-
ment is either entirely unavailable or may be had in only limited classes
of cases.rs The New York decisions indicate a judicial willingness to grant
the speaking motion or summary judgment when it is clear that the action
is barred.54 However, the highest court of that state has given an appro-
priate warning by its reversal of a summary judgment granted on the
basis of the statutory bar when there was doubt as to when the transactions
occurred.55 A number of trial court decisions correctly deny judgment
when the papers disclose some issuable question of fact with reference to
the alleged bar.56 Many cases in which there is ultimate disposition on
the ground that the action is barred cannot be disposed of by summary
judgment procedure, but there are a substantial number where this is
possible. In the latter the motion is the speediest, most efficient manner of
case disposition.
50 Reynolds v. Needle, 77 App. D.C. 53, 132 F. 2d 161 (1942) ; Harris Stanley
Coal & Land Co., v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. 154 F. 2d 450 (6th Cir. 1946);
Deer v. New York Cent. R. Co., 202 F. 2d 625 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Burns v. Chicago
M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 192 F. 2d 472 (8th Cir. 1951) ; Kithcart v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 150 F. 2d 997 (8th Cir. 1945); Gifford v. Travelers Protective Ass'n,
153 F. 2d 209 (9th Cir. 1946). But see Begnaud v. White, 170 F. 2d 323 (6th Cir,
1948) and cf. cases cited note 45 supra.
51 See Guaranty Mortgage & Security Co. v. City of Chicago, 328 Ill. App.
276, 65 N.E. 2d 632 (1946) ; Note, 1949 U. OF ILL. LAW FoumU 170.
52 See note 54 infra. Summary judgment proper is limited to contract actions
or those to recover a chattel or damages for taking or detention thereof, or where
the defense is based upon documentary evidence. New York Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Rule 113. But the speaking motion is permitted in any action upon the
ground that the action is barred by limitations. Id. Rule 107(5).
53 See VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 219-220
(1949).
54 Trans America Development Corp. v. Leon, 279 App. Div. 189, 108 N.Y.S.
2d 769 (1951) (partial judgment) ; Sacco v. Rocco, 277 App. Div. 1012, 100 N.Y.S.
2d 367 (1950) (no payments) ; Ripley v. International Railways of Cent. America,
276 App. Div. 1006, 95 N.Y.S. 2d 871 (1950) (partial judgment); Corash v. Texas
Co., 264 App. Div. 292, 35 N.Y.S. 2d 334 (1942) (against vague claim of ex-
ceptions); Loehr v. East Side Omnibus Corporation, 259 App. Div. 200, 18 N.Y.S.
2d 529 (1940) (question of law as to which statute applicable decided) ; Arnstein
v. Crestview Music Corporation, 88 N.Y.S. 2d 175 (1949) (newspaper libel).
55 Coane v. American Distilling Co., 298 N.Y. 197, 81 N.E. 2d 87 (1948).
5 6 Rabinovitch v. Auerbach, 200 Misc. 77, 100 N.Y.S. 2d 923 (1950) (tolling
by absence) ; Nervick v. Fine, 195 Misc. 464, 87 N.Y.S. 2d 534 (1949) (when cause
for malpractice accrued); Gigerich v. Ronkonkoma Realty Corporation, 69 N.Y.S.
2d 228 (1947) (part payment-interest) ; De Young v. Coady, 64 N.Y.S. 2d 527
(1946) (discovery of fraud); Press v. Draper, 139 Misc. 263, 247 N.Y. Supp. 156
(1930) (reasonable time to perform promise of marriage). See also Jones v. 416
Pleasant Ave. Holding Corporation, 90 N.Y.S. 2d 92 (1949) (doubt as to nature of
plaintiff's cause); Cannella v. Cannella, 80 N.Y.S. 2d 459 (1948) (denied in dis-
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(4) Answer
Many recent opinions reiterate the brthodox proposition that when
the defense of the general statute of limitations cannot be or is not taken
by demurrer, it must be asserted -by plea or answer or is deemed waived,"'
although a few decisions deny this in the case of equitable causes s The
general rule has been held to apply even though the plaintiff's pleading
was demurrable on the ground of limitations. 9 Indeed it is held in some
states that failure to demur to a complaint showing he action was barred
is a waiver of the defense and that it is too late to raise the point by
answer,6" although other cases deny this.61
It is generally agreed that the defense of the general statute is not
asserted by general denial." It is neither necessary nor proper to deny
the date of accrual alleged in the complaint, or to set up the true date
thereof, or the date of commencement of the action.6 3 The form of
answer indicated by the-Advisory Committee for use under the Federal
Rules is: "The right of action set forth in the complaint did not accrue
within six years before commencement of this action." 64 This is sub-
stantially that of the common law pleaders6 5 and has recognition in a
number of state court decisions. 6 It is not. sufficient to state that the
"cause of action did not accrue within the past two years," since "past"
refers to the time of the answer rather than to the date of the commence-
cretion); Safrin v. Friedman, 277 App. Div. 1138, 101 N.Y.S. 2d 216 (1950)
(partial judgment denied in discretion when remainder of claim was not barred).
57 E.g., Mulligan v. Hilton, 305 Mass. 5, 24 N.E. 2d 676 (1940) ; Dunning v.
Dunning, 300 N.Y. 341, 90 N.E. 2d 884 (1950); Venmex Oil Co. v. Thomas, 189
Okla. 407, 117 P. 2d 540 (1941) ; Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 113 P. 2d 963 (1941).
58Roberts v. Burgett, 209 Ark. 536, 191 S.W. 2d 579 (1946).
59Miller v. Parker,.128 Cal. App. 2d 775, 18 P. 2d 89 (1933); Landers
Lumber Co. v. Short, 81 S.W. 2d 375 (Mo. App. 1935) (particularly must be
pleaded when petition discloses the bar); Venmex Oil Co. v. Thomas, 189 Okla.
407, 117 P. 2d 540 (1941); but cf. Eisler v. Tumo, 93 Ind. App. 521, 176 N.E. 862
(1931).
60 See State v. Nolte, 350 Mo. 271, 165 S.W. 2d 632 (1942); Eastern Outfitting
Co. v. Lamb, 169 Wash. 480, 14 P. 2d 30 (1932); Eastman v. Crary, 131 Ore. 694,
284 Pac. 280 (1930) ; Cornelison v. United States Building & Loan Ass'n, 50 Idaho
1, 292 Pac. 243 (1930).
61 D. A. Foley & Co. v. State, 119 Cal. App. 300, 6 P. 2d 283 (1931); Conklin
v. Towne, 204 Iowa 916, 216 N.W. 264 (1927).
62 Murray v. De Luxe Motor Stages of Illinois, 133 S.W. 2d 1074 (Mo. App.
1939) ; Crayton v. Phillips, 4 S.W. 2d 961 (Tex. Com. App. 1928) (general issue).
But see Evans v. Zeigler, 91 Cal. App. 2d 226, 204 P. 2d 902 (1949) indicating
that the statute is raised by general denial to complaint consisting of the common
counts.
63 See Schoolfield v. Second Dist. No. 1 in Custer County, 101 Colo. 56, 70
P. 2d 353 (1937); Norwood v. Eastern Oregon Land Co., 139 Ore. 25, 5 P. 2d
1057, 7 P. 2d 996 (1932). Cf. Shield v. Brown, 166 Va. 596, 186 S.E. 33 (1936).
See Pleading, Supra note 1, at 943.
64 
FED. R. Civ. P. Form 20 (4).
65 Pleading, supra note 1, at 938-939.
66 See cases cited note 63 supra.
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ment of the action. 67 In a few jurisdictions, under the influence of
statutory provisions, the answer must contain explicit reference to the
applicable limitation." Here the defendant must literally plead the
statute. This is a departure from our general philosophy that it is un-
necessary to plead law.
(5) Amendments to Answer
The question of waivability by failure to raise the defense in the
answer -becomes acute in the cases where the defendant seeks to insert the
matter by amendment to his answer, particularly after the trial has begun.
Should this be permitted? There is no easy answer to this question either
on the basis of the authorities or upon considerations of justice. Several
variations of an old lawyer's tale will serve to point up the problem. The
story concerns the defense against a substantial claim, part of which was
clearly barred by limitation; counsel expressly waived this defense by his
pleading and was able to inform the jury of the waiver with the antici-
pated result that this had such a profound psychological effect upon the
lay gents that they decided for defendant upon the -basis of a more dubious
defense which was applicable to the plaintiff's entire claim. By way of
alteration of the story, let us assume that at the trial the second defense
fell entirely flat. In that event may the defendant take advantage of the
statute of limitations at this late date? Surely not by motion for directed
verdict without a chance for the plaintiff to controvert or avoid the bar.
The defense of the statute of limitations is peculiar in that the bar will
very likely appear from the evidence although the point is not being con-
ciously litigated. Obviously the defendant cannot swoop down and take
a directed verdict just because the dates shown in evidence in the course of
natural narration disclose that the action was apparently commenced too
late, without giving the plaintiff full opportunity to show that the action
was not actually barred.
Further varying the facts, suppose that midway of the trial defendant
asked for an amendment of his answer setting up the statute as a defense,
should the amendment be allowed in order to permit litigation of the
question? It is likely that the plaintiff may not then be ready upon the law
and the facts of the defense, even if he has adequately prepared his case.
He would be justified in the belief that the point had been waived and
that he was not expected to respond to the statute. Even if he is ready,
or if a continuance is granted to permit him to prepare, should our
imaginary defendant and his counsel be permitted to throw off the con-
sequences of their grandstanding where it appears to be unsuccessful?
A third variation is closer to the heart of the problem. Suppose there
was no express waiver of the defense of the statute of limitations and no
67 Green v. Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., 92 Fla. 396, 109 So. 471
(1926).
68 Dawson v. McNaney, 71 Ariz. 79, 223 P. 2d 907 (1950); Davenport v.
Stratton, 24 Cal. 2d 232, 149 P. 2d 4 (1944) (must plead subdivision of section).
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attempt to gain psychological advantage by refraining from raising the
point, but the failure to plead the statute was due to the fact that counsel
had 'been in error as to the applicable limitation period, or simply that the
defense had not occurred to him. Should the defendant be entitled to
raise the point by actual amendment or by asserting the defense without
an amendment?
Federal Rule 15 provides that a party may amend with leave and
"leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." The district court
decisions indicate that permission to add the statute of limitations to the
defenses already pleaded in the answer is freely given.69 As a whole the
recent state court decisions indicate that the matter of adding the defense
to the answer is a matter of the trial court's discretion; most of the cases
fall in the category of affirmance of the trial court's allowance of the
amendment.7" Other decisions affirm the trial court's denial of the
amendment.7" The Supreme Court of California reversed when the trial
court denied the amendment as a matter of law; it was declared that
discretion should have been exercised.7" A few cases declare that it was
error for the trial court to deny the amendment.73 Apparently only
69 Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 15 F.R.D. 354 (N.D. Ill.
1953) (allowed on second trial when case law had changed); Di Trapani v.
M. A. Henry Co., 7 F.R.D. 123 (S.D. N.Y. 1946); Cornell v. Chase Brass & Copper
Co., 48 F. Supp. 979 (SD. N.Y. 1943) (after amendment of plaintiff's pleading);
Downey v. Palmer, 27 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. N.Y. 1939) (error as to statute first
pleaded). But cf. Vant Sant v. American Express Co., 169 F. 2d 355 (3rd Cir.
1948) (amendment denied by appelate court on reversal). See also Haskins v.
Roseberry, 119 F. 2d 803 (9th Cir. 1941) where the unpleaded defense was tried
with the implied consent of the parties; cf. Goodwin v. Townsend, 197 F. 2d 970
(3rd Cir. 1952) (amendment unnecessary in statutory action).
70 Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 172 Ark. 647, 291 S.W. 90 (1927) (after complaint
was amended); Wrightson v. Dougherty, 5 Cal. 2d 257, 54 P. 2d 13 (1936);
Flanders v. Kochenberger, 118 Colo. 104, 193 P. 2d 281 (1948) (after issue joined
and before trial); Saunders v. Cresswell Roll Forming Co., 83 A. 2d 697 (Del.
Super. 1951); Conklin v. Towne, 204 Iowa 916, 216 N.W. 264 (1927) (after
plaintiff's evidence disclosed bar); Conley v. Conley, 307 Ky. 429, 211 SAV. 2d
401 (1948) -(one year after evidence closed but before judgment) ; Lau v. Pontiac
Commercial & Savings Bank, 260 Mich. 73, 244 N.W. 233 (1932); Haney v.
Thomson, 339 Mo. 505, 98 S.W. 2d 639 (1936); F. M. Slagle & Co. v. Bushnell,
70 S.D. 250, 16 N.W. 2d 914 (1944) (after taking testimony); McTaggart v. Texas
Bitulithic Co., 132 S.W. 2d 436 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Walker v. Sieg, 23 Wash.
2d 552, 161 P. 2d 542 (1945); Haueter v. Budlow, 256 Wis. 561, 42 NAV. 2d 261
(1950). See also Levi v. Sackerman, 131 Misc. 40, 225 N.Y. Supp. 658 (1927);
Festa v. Schuman Bros., 87 D. & C. 152 (Pa. C.P. 1953).
71 Overton v. White, 18 Cal. App. 2d 567, 64 P. 2d 758 (1937) (original
answer pleaded wrong subdivision) ; Murray v. De Luxe Motor Stages of Illinois,
133 S.W. 2d 1074 (Mo. App. 1939); Ayuso v. Lane Foods, 279 App. Div. 613,
107 N.Y.S. 2d 718 (1951) (after first trial); Vermillion v. Haynes, 211 S.W. 2d
781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
72 Davenport v. Stratton, 24 Cal. 2d 232, 149 P. 2d 4 (1944).
7 Wyrick v. Wyrick, 243 S.W. 2d 1004 (Ky. 1951); Butke v. Nachsechoen,
132 Neb. 514, 272 N.W. 326 (1937); Levin v. Levin, 246 App. Div. 783, (1935)
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Maryland takes the flat position that the bar cannot be asserted by
amendment. 74
It is a fair summary of the cases cited in the last paragraph that the
courts commonly allow the plea of the statute of limitations to be added
by amendment, frequently at late stages, and usually without much dis-
cussion. One would expect that the amendment should be allowed where
the nature of the plaintiff's claim was not fully indicated by his pleading,
when the defendant was misled by plaintiff's allegations of incorrect dates,
when the defense was defectively set forth in the original answer, or even
if the latter relied on an inapplicable statutory period. But the cases go
beyond these situations and allow a late assertion of the defense without
inquiry into the considerations existing in the particular case.
Presumably trial court discretion and appellate court control should
be tempered by the judicial attitude of favor, disfavor, or neutrality
toward the defense sought to be injected by amendment. Courts may
affectuate their prejudices toward causes of action or defenses by appli-
cation of appropriate procedural handicaps. Allocation of burden of proof
is perhaps the most prominent example of this.75 Easy waivability of a
defense by denial of the right to amend is another.7"
What is the judicial attitude toward the defense of the statute of
limitations? If one judges by what the courts say in this7 and other
(three years delay) ; Tribulas v. Continental Equitable Title & Trust Co., 331 Pa.
283, 200 At. 659 (1938) ; see Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co.,
54 Vyo. 1042, 92 P. 2d 572 (1939) where existence of the bar did not become
apparent until the trial.
74 Lichtenberg v. Joyce, 183 Md. 689, 39 A. 2d 789 (1944) (based on code
provision).
75 See text at 79 infra et seq.
78 Problems connected with the right to amend the complaint after statute of
limitations has run present another opportunity for the courts to favor or disfavor
the defense by a ruling of a procedural nature. A liberal attitude toward the
allowance of such amendments manifested in Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v.
Wulf, 226 U.S. 570 (1913) and United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S.
62 (1933) is now manifested in FED. R. Cnw. P. 15(c). See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 574 (1945). The recent state decisions have indicated
a similar liberality. Wennerholm v. Stanford University School of Medicine, 20
Cal. 2d 713, 128 P. 2d 522 (1942); Griffin v. Workman, 73 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1954) ;
Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Bowman Dairy Co., 369 Ill. 222, 15 N.E. 2d 838 (1938) ;
Ross v. Robinson, 174 Ore. 25, 147 P. 2d 204 (1944); De Loach v. Greggs, 222
S.C. 326, 72 S.E. 2d 647 (1952). But cf. Webb v. Eggleston, 228 N.C. 574, 46 S.E.
2d 700 (1948) ; Parker v. Fies & Sons, 243 Ala. 348, 10 So. 2d 13 (1942) ; Harriss v.
Tams, 258 N.Y. 229, 179 N.E. 476 (1932); see also Martin v. Hall, 297 Ky. 537,
180 S.V. 2d 390 (1944). Many of these cases involve statutory actions, wherein
less liberality may be expected than in cases of amendments after the statute of
limitations has run. See text at note 103 infra. Generally see CLARK, CODE
PLEADING 729-734 (1947) ; notes, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 569 (1951) ; 34 ILL. L. REV. 765
(1940); 22 IowA L. REv. 128 (1936); 25 N.C. L. Rav. 76 (1946); 7 OKLA. L. REy.
82 (1954) ; 29 TEXAS L. REV. 380 (1951) ; annotation, 8 A.L.R. 2d 6 (1949) (change
of parties).
77 Compare Walker v. Sieg, 23 Wash. 2d 552, 161 P. 2d 542 (1945) .(like any
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connections there is a hopeless conflict of viewpoint. The best test of
their stand is the courts' doings rather than their sayings. By this yard-
stick the decisions permitting the statute of limitations to be asserted by
amendment to the answer certainly do not disfavor the defense, although
it is hard to say whether the position is one of neutrality or of favor.
Fortunately the defense is not favored to the extent of allowing the
court to assert it ex mero motu. 7
8
The writer questions the judicial attitude toward the defense of the
statute of limitations as indicated by the results of the amendment de-
cisions, and further regrets the sub silento character of the manifestation.
This concern is based on ethical considerations. The underlying reasons
for enactment of the statutes of limitations are: (1) to require litigation
to be initiated when the evidence is fairly fresh, (2) to protect one against
a stale claim when he has shaped his affairs upon the basis that non-
assertion for a long time indicates that the matter will never be pressed.
Of course when one asserts'the defense of the statute in a proper and
timely manner, there is no occasion for inquiry into the matter of whether
these bases of policy are applicable to the defendant's situation. However,
there are certainly cases where they do not apply, e.g. those in which the
evidence is documentary and the claimant has been constantly pressing
for payment or settlement. The defense of time limitations does not
have the same universal righteousness as self defense, payment, absence
of operative facts necessary to constitute the plaintiff's claim, or even such
matters as contributory negligence or failure of consideration. It may be
just to allow the assertion of these matters at a fairly late stage of the
action, even though failure to raise them sooner was caused by defendant's
inattention or initial decision to abandon them. But is it not reasonable
to assume that a defendant, who is duly apprised of plaintiff's claim and
to whom the reasons of policy underlying the protection given by the
statute of limitations are applicable, would plead the 'bar in the first in-
stance unless he wished to waive the defense? Is it not fair to insist on
timeliness of assertion, or a good excuse for delay, in order to permit
reliance upon a ground which may or may not have an ethical basis?
It seems to the writer that these questions should be answered in the
affirmative, and that hence the courts should deny applications for
amendments interjecting the statute, unless it is shown that plaintiff's
pleadings somehow misled the defendant or that the defendant is ethically
entitled to the defense because of loss or impairment of evidence or change
of his situation due to his reliance upon the delay in bringing the action.
other defense); Van Diest v. Towle, 116 Colo. 20z, 179 P. 2d 984 (1947)
(favored) ; Lichtenberg v. Joyce, 183 Md. 689, 39 A. 2d 789 (1944) (disfavored) ;
Howard v. Waale-Camplan & Tiberti, 67 Nev. 304, 217 P. 2d 872 (1950) (no
presumption in its favor).
78 See Bachertz v. Hayes-Lucas Lumber Co., 201 Minn. 171, 275 N.V. 694
(1937).
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(6) Burden of Proof
The prevailing view 79 that the risk of non-persuasion is upon the
defendant to show that the action is barred by the statute of limitations
continues to be general, and if anything to gain ground. Michigan is
apparently a recruit to the majority ranks.8" Acceptance of the orthodox
position is now said to be well settled in Arkansas. 81 However, the
Massachusetts" and North Carolina 8 cases adhere to their viewpoint
that when the defense is properly pleaded the burden is upon the plaintiff
to show that his action was brought in time.
The foregoing applies only to the simple issue as to the lapse of the
normal statutory period. When the question is whether the statutory
period has been extended by such matters as part payment, new promise,
or fraudulent concealment, the traditional view 4 is that the burden of
proof is upon the plaintiff to show that he comes within these exceptions.
85
Here again the current holdings follow the old path. This position jibes
with the handling of these exceptions in the law of pleading. 8 It is also
true that the facts concerning these exceptions are principally or at least
equally within the knowledge of the plaintiff. This is not true with
regard to provisions tolling the statute while the defendant was absent
from the state. Recent cases shoulder the defendant with the burden of
proof as to such matters.8 This seems a reasonable exception to an
exception.
ADVERSE POSSEssION
The traditional view that a plaintiff who relies upon adverse possession
for the statutory period may plead ownership generally and sustain the
7 Pleading, supra note 1, at note 9. In Pauley v. Salmon River Lumber
Co., 74 Idaho 483, 264 P. 2d 466 (1953) the rule was applied although the complaint
showed on its face that the action was barred. In re Saladino, 81 N.Y.S. 2d 503
(Surr. 1948) seems out of line with the prevailing rule in the holding that one
seeking to establish a claim has the burden of showing that the instrument is
under seal in order to avoid the limitation provisions as to unsealed instruments.
80Tumey v. City of Detroit, Department of Street Railways, 316 Mich. 400,
25 N.V. 2d 571 (1947); ef. Ayres v. Hubbard, 71 Mich. 594, 40 N.W. 10 (1888).
81 McCrite v. Hendrix College, 198 Ark. 1149, 133 S.V. 2d 31 (1939).
82 Chandler v. Dunlop, 311 Mass. 1, 39 N.E. 2d 969 (1942).
83 Jennings v. Morehead City, 226 N.C. 606, 39 S.E. 2d 610 (1946).
8 4 Pleading, supra note 1, at note 9.
85 Cole v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 242 Iowa 416, 46 N.W. 2d 811
(1951) (concealment) ; Cadena v. Cadena, 223 S.W. 2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949)
(duration of delay); Kuteman v. Alexander, 201 S.W. 2d 73 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947) (new promise); Wickwire v. Reard, 37 Wash. 2d 748, 226 P. 2d 192 (1951)
(voluntary payment); see also Woods v. Sanders, 247 Ala. 492, 25 So. 2d 141
(1946).8 6 Pleading, supra note 1, at 921.
87 Banister v. Solomon, 126 F. 2d 740 (2d Cir. 1942); Haimes v. Schonwit,
268 App. Div. 652, 52 N.Y.S. 2d 272 (1945); Rabinovitch v. Auerbach, 100 N.Y.S.
2d 923 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (non-resident defendant) ; In re Seitz, 31 D.&C. 74 (Pa. C.P.
1937); Bethel Mills v. Whitcomb, 116 Vt. 357, 76 A. 2d 548 (1950) (to show
existence of property within state).
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allegation by proof of facts establishing the adverse possession is reiterated
in several recent cases," although others seem to require allegation of the
specific facts which are necessary to establish tide by this means. 89 The
latter may be considered as indications of a judicial desire to handicap a
plaintiff who asserts tide by 'this means. However, unless the allocation
of the burden of proof9" is considered to be an instance, most courts have
not imposed procedural handicaps upon the one claiming by adverse
possession. For example, the prevailing rule permits him to have the
cloud of the record tide removed in an equity suit.9" The orthodox view
is tied to the title concept which is a convenient one in the law of
pleading, particularly in the modern systems. Courts which have adhered
to this position are not likely to waver, even if some strong reason could
be asserted for the change.
When the defendant in an action to recover land relies upon tide
by adverse possession, a number of recent cases sustain the prevailing view
that any answer which puts plaintiff's title in issue is sufficient to enable
defendant to prove his defense.9 There are, however, a few decisions to
the contrary.9" The proposition seems to be a corollary of that discussed
in the preceding paragraph: if the plaintiff may show title by adverse
possession under his general allegation of ownership, the defendant should
be permitted to show his adverse possession under a denial of plaintiff's
title. However, in Kentucky it seems that defendant must plead adverse
possession specifically although plaintiff need not.94 Where statutes or
court rules enumerate the defense of the statute of limitations as one
8 8 Merrill v. Hooper, 125 Cal. App. 80, 13 P. 2d 786 (1932); Bryant v.
Bullock, 309 Ky. 590, 218 S.W. 2d 381 (1949); Gubser v. Town, 273 P. 2d 430
(Ore. 1954). But cf. Reeves v. Porta, 173 Ore. 147, 144 P. 2d 493 (1944).
89 Hauber v. Gentry, 215 S.W. 2d 754 (Mo. 1948); Bixby v. Backues, 346
Mo. 955, 144 S.W. 2d 112 (1940). A similar rule exists in Texas. Merriman v.
Lary, 196 S.W. 2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); Buvens v. Brown, 290 S.W. 1086
(Tex. Com. App. 1927).
90 See text at notes 97-102 infra.
91 Withroder v. Wiederoder, 156 Kan. 570, 134 P. 2d 381 (1943); Broome v.
Jackson, 193 Miss. 66, 7 So. 2d 829, 8 So. 2d 245 (1942); see annotation, 78 A.L.R.
24 at 110.
92 Guy v. Lancaster, 250 Ala. 226, 34 So. 2d 10 (1948) (sufficiency of special
pleas immaterial when defendant also pleaded not guilty) ; Culverhouse v. Glenn,
247 Ala. 622, 25 So. 2d 719 (1946); Hub Bel Air, Inc. v. Hirsch, 203 Md. 637,
102 A. 2d 550 (1954); Courtner v. Putnam, 325 Mo. 924, 30 S.W. 2d 126 (1930)
(general denial); Wilberforce University v. College of Education, 86 Ohio App.
121, 90 N.E. 2d 172 (1948) (same); Morris v. Nelson, 136 W.Va. 722, 68 S.E. 2d 9
(1951) (statute). See also Anderson v. Village Homebuilders, 401 Ill. 60, 81 N.E.
2d 430 (1948) (quiet title), noted in U. of ILL. L. FORUM 170 (1949).
93 Wooten v. Ratliff, 306 Ky. 187, 206 S.W. 2d 830 (1947) (action to enjoin
trespass) ; Jones v. Moseley, 29 Tenn. App. 559, 198 S.W. 2d 652 (1946) (equity
suit).
94 See Wooten v. Ratliff, note 93 supra and compare cases cited in note 88
jupra.
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which must be set up in the answer,95 prudent counsel for a defendant
claiming title 'by adverse possession would not rely upon his denial of
plaintiff's title as sufficient basis for introduction of evidence of the defense.
However, this point does not seem to have been adjudged under the
Federal Rules or state procedures having similar provisions.
9 6
In general the recent cases dealing with the burden of proof, in
the sense of risk of non-persuasion, are quite uniform in declaring that
the burden is upon the person asserting title to land by adverse possession,
whether he be the plaintiff or the defendant."7 The same rule applies to
personalty. 9 Some opinions are emphatic in their pronouncements.
99
It is frequently declared that the burden extends to all elements of title
by adverse possession. 100 However, in particular cases a presumption as
to the adverse nature of the claim is sometimes indulged in favor of the
claimant. .01 In addition, the burden of going forward may, in certain
states of the proof, be shifted to the opponents.
10 2
95 See tevt at notes 23, 28, 35-37, 4042, 62-63 supra.
96 Cf. Haskins v. Roseberry, 119 F. 2d 803 (9th Cir. 1941); see cases cited
note 93 supra.
97The following are representative of the many cases on this point. Labarre
v. Rateau, 210 La. 34, 26 So. 2d 279 (1946); Louis Sachs & Sons v. Ward, 182
Md. 835, 35 A. 2d 161 (1943) (injunction against trespass) ; Simpson v. Sheridan,
231 Minn. 118, 42 N.W. 2d 402 (1950) (boundary dispute); Warren v. Warren,
261 P. 2d 364 (Mont. 1953); Thomas v. Hipp, 223 N.C. 515, 27 S.E. 2d 528 (1943);
Grandin v. Gardiner, 63 N.W. 2d 128 (N.D. 1954-). See also cases cited notes
99, 100 infra.
98 Redmond v. New Jersey Historical Society, 132 N.J.Eq. 464, 28 A. 2d 189
(1942).
99 Duke v. Harden, 259 Ala. 398, 66 So. 2d 899 (1953) (very strict burden);
Thomas v. Durchslag, 404 Ill. 581, 90 N.E. 2d 200 (1950) (clear, positive and un-
equivocal proof); Village of Newport v. Taylor, 225 Minn. 299, 30 N.W. 2d 588
(1948) (similar); Wilcox v. Wickizer, 266 P. 2d 638 (Okla. 1954) (similar)
Redmond v. New Jersey Historical Society, note 98 supra.
100 Clark v. Stotts, 274 P. 2d 172 (Cal. App. 1954); Holmes v. Johnson,
324 Mass. 450, 86 N.E. 2d 924- (1949); Newport v. Taylor, supra note 99; Smith v.
Cook, 213 Miss. 876, 58 So. 2d 27 (1952) ; Redmond v. New Jersey Historical
Society, note 98 supra; Knight v. Hilton, 224 S.C. 452, 79 S.E. 2d 871 (1954);
Brown v. Hubbard, 42 Wash. 2d 867, 259 P. 2d 391 (1953).
101 Hodge v. Terrill, 123 Colo. 196, 228 P. 2d 984 (1951); Lively v. Wick,
122 Colo. 156, 221 P. 2d 374 (1950); Suck v. Benton Township, 66 N.W. 2d 434
(Iowa 1954); Landers v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 1169, 205 S.W. 2d 544 (194-7)
(to boundary fence); Knotts v. joiner, 217 S.C. 105, 59 S.E. 2d 850 (1950) (un-
explained possession); Jefferies v. Benavides, 220 S.W. 2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949).
102Faire v. Burke, 363 Mo. 562, 252 S.W. 2d 289 (1952); Tillman v.
Hutcherson, 348 Mo. 473, 154 S.W. 2d 104 (1941). The foregoing cases are based,
in part at least, upon the presumption mentioned in the note 101 supra; cf.
Watson v. Ross, 127 S.W. 2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). See Louis Sachs & Sons
v. Vard, 182 Md. 385, 35 A. 2d 161 (1943) where it was held in a suit to enjoin
trespass that the original burden was on plaintiff to prove that defendants were
trespassers, but when the latter claimed by adverse possession the burden shifted.
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STATUTORY ACTIONS
When the action is of statutory origin and the legislation creating
the right fixes the time limitation for bringing suit, the cases indicate
somewhat different procedural treatment from that applied under the
general statute. While failure to comply with the latter is regarded as
a defense, observance of the limitation in statutory actions is usually
regarded as a condition precedent to plaintiff's right.' In other words,
timeliness is a part of his cause of action. Some opinions indicate that
plaintiff should plead literally that his statutory action was commenced
within the special period.' °4 At least when the complaint discloses that
the date of accrual of the cause of action was not within the permissible
time, a demurrer or demurrer-type motion will be sustained.' Of course
this follows a fortiori in the many jurisdictions which approve this manner
of raising the general statute of limitations.' Even if the particular court
requires a special demurrer to raise the defense of the general statute, it
would seem that a demurrer for want of facts would be sufficient upon
the condition precedent philosophy applied to the statutory action.' ° 7 Since
there are usually no exceptions to the normal bar in case of the statutory
actions,108 and since the possibility of exceptions is the only substantial ob-
See also Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P. 2d 570, 113 P. 2d 963 (1941) (adverse
possessor against mortgagee-burden on latter).
103 Peters v. Public Service Corporation, 132 N.J.Eq. 500, 29 A. 2d 189 (1942)
aff'd 133 N.J.Eq. 283, 31 A. 2d 809 (1943); Sabol v. Pekoc, 148 Ohio St. 545, 76
N.E. 2d 84 (1947); Tillinghast v. Reed, 70 RI. 259, 38 A. 2d 782 (1944). See
annotation, 67 A.L.R. 1070 (1930) ; see case note 105 infra. But see Brookshire v.
Burkhart, 141 Okla. 1, 283 Pac. 571 (1929) (death action); also note 114 infra.
104 Callahan v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 40 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Ky. 1941);
State for Use of Dunnigan v. Cobourn, 171 Md. 23, 187 Atl. 881 (1936); Hammond
v. Southampton, 77 N.Y. 2d 156 (1947). But see Colyar v. Atlantic States Motor
Lines, 231 N.C. 318, 56 S.E. 2d 647 (1949) ; Yablonsky v. City of New York, 128
Misc. 469, 218 N.Y. Supp. 121 (1927).
105 A. G. Reeves Steel Const. Co. v. Weiss, 119 F." 2d 472 (6th Cir. 1941);
Franzen v. Zimmerman, 127 Colo. 381, 256 P. 2d 897 (1953); Wilson v. Tromly,
404 Ill. 307, 89 N.E. 2d 22 (1949); Baysinger v. Hanser, 355 Mo. 1042, 199 S.W.
2d 644 (1947); Natseway v. Jojola, 56 N.M. 793, 251 P. 2d 274 (1952); Tollerson
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 188 N.C. 67, 198 S.E. 164 (1938) ; Sabol v. Pekoc,
note 103 supra; Commonwealth v. McClane, 154 Pa. Super. 246, 35 A. 2d 745
(1944) ; Tillinghast v. Reed, note 103 supra. See also Bowles v. American Distilling
Co., 62 F. Supp. 20 (S.D. N.Y. 1945) (ambiguous date); Weese v. Weese, 58
S.E. 2d 801 (W.Va. 1950). See also cases note 104 supra and annotation, 107
A.L.R. 1048 (1937). But see Brookshire v. Burkhart, note 103 supra.
106 See text at -26, 37, 40-41 supra.
107 See Sabol v. Pekoc, note 103 supra.
108 Wilson v. Tromly, 404 II1. 307, 89 N.E. 2d 22 (1949); Berghuis v.
Korthuis, 228 Minn. 534, 37 N.W. 2d 809 (1949) ; Peters v. Public Service Corpo-
ration, note 103 supra; Natseway v. Jojola, 56 N.M. 793, 251 P. 2d 274 (1952).
See Sabol v. Pekoc, note 103 supra. But see Osbourne v. United States, 164 F. 2d
767 (2d Cir. 1947) (denying general tolling provisions of state law but applying
nonstatutory tolling in favor of one imprisoned by the enemy).
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jection to assertion of time limitations by demurrer,"0 9 it is rationai to
permit the objection to be raised by demurrer in the statutory actions even
if the jurisdiction denies this when the general statute is involved.
When the complaint contains a general allegation that the action
was commenced in time, it probably follows that defendant's general or
specific denial puts the matter in issue if plaintiff's allegation is regarded
as part of his cause. There are apparently no cases holding that the
general denial puts in issue the plaintiff's allegation of a date of accrual
indicating timely commencement of the action; this position would cer-
tainly be at variance with orthodox pleading principles.1 10 However, the
cases holding that the defendant can insist on the objection of time
limitations in the statutory actions at the trial without raising it in any
manner by his pleadings, III are even more surprising. Perhaps the matter
is not of much consequence inasmuch as the defendant would probably be
permitted to amend his answer so as to say whatever is necessary to put
timeliness in issue. Since the courts are so free in allowing a belated plea
of the general statute,"1 2 they would certainly be at least as liberal in
allowing the defendant to amend in order to contest performance of a
condition precedent to the plaintiff's claim.
In this connection it is interesting to speculate upon the situation
where the plaintiff alleges generally the performance of all conditions
precedent, as he is entitled to do in many jurisdictions. Presumably this
allegation covers the timeliness of the statutory action.- At least under the
Federal Rules, the defendant must then deny performance specifically
and with particularity in order to contest a condition precedent.1 13 Con-
sequently the defendant would seem to be obliged to plead the lapse of
time in practically the same manner as in case of the general statute,
regardless of whether his objection comes within the list of defenses
which Federal Rule 9 (c) declares must be affirmatively pleaded. 1 4
The condition precedent category may well reverse the field as to the
burden of pleading time limitations in the statutory actions if procedural
rules are carried to their logical conclusions.
109 See text following note 24 supra.
110 See text at 63 supra; also note 15 supra.
111 Goodwin v. Townsend, 197 F. 2d 970 (3d Cir. 1952). Werner v. United
States, 10 F.R.D. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1950) ; Berry v. Heller, 79 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa.
1948) (court may raise of its own motion) ; Model Land & Irrigation Co. v. Baca
Irrigating Ditch Co., 83 Colo. 131, 262 Pac. 517 (1928); Yablonsky v. City of
New York, 128 Misc. 469, 219 N.Y. Supp. 121 (1927); Neely v. Minus, 196 N.C.
345, 145 S.E. 771 (1928). See John F. Jelke v. Smietanka, 86 F. 2d 470 (7th Cir.
1936); Goodwin v. Townsend, 197 F. 2d 970 (3d Cir. 1952); Deckert v. Burns,
62 N.W. 2d 879 (S.D. 1954); Peterson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 79 Utah 213, 8 P. 2d
627 (1932). But cf. Sheeter v. Lifur, 113 Cal. App. 2d 729, 249 P. 2d 336 (1952)
(limitations contained in Revenue and Taxation Code).
112 See notes 69-73 supra and accompanying text.
113 Federal Rule 9 (c).
114 See text at notes 23, 35, 95-96 supra.
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The decisions in the statutory actions cases reaflirm the traditional
view placing the burden of proof as to timeliness of the action on the
plaintiff." 5 This is defensible if the statutory actions have been thus ex-
pressly disfavored by the legislature, or if the courts are justified in
attaching this procedural handicap without legislative command. Wanting
these elements there is no reason why this procedural burden should be
placed upon the plaintiff just because the common law gave him no
substantive right and the time limitation provision is contained in the
statute creating that right. Why should the burden of proof on this issue
be on the plaintiff in a statutory death action, but on the defendant in
actions for personal injury, defamation or malicious prosecution?.. 6
Probably the reader can sense the writer's feeling that this paper
lacks the procedural breadth and interest of the latter's earlier study of the
subject. In the main this is due 'to the fact that few recent relevant
opinions have the sparkle and discernment which so often characterized
the earlier cases. This, of course, is disappointing to a lover of the
tradition and the art of pleading. On the other hand the last thirty years
have seen considerable gains from the standpoint of practical law ad-
ministration in this relatively small area. The very dearth of technical
nicety concerning time limitations in their procedural aspects is indicative
of the modern spirit of case disposition in the quickest and simplest possible
manner-let procedure serve instead of govern. This spirit is manifested
in specific provisions of the Federal Rules applicable to the problems here
considered as well as in the general features of the Rules which apply
equally to many other matters. Courts, federal and state, have employed
the summary judgment and other motion procedures to the end of speedy
disposition of barred claims.
There is one adverse reflection which goes beyond a nostalgic
yearning for the days when the decisions contained keener discussions of
procedural matters. It is the widespread judicial neglect of the opportunity
to implement substantive policy regarding time limitations by means of
decisions upon procedural points. This is particularly true with reference
to the handling of the problem of amending the answer, and to the
general implementation of procedure in the statutory actions. Due at-
tention to the policy 'considerations in the latter would also have led to
"15Melnik v. Perwak, 295 Mass. 512, 4 N.E. 2d 329 (1936); Knorp v.
Thompson, 352 Mo. 44, 175 S.W. 2d 889 (1943); Neely v. Minus, 196 N.C. 345,
145 S.E. 771 (1928). But see Haas v. New York P. G. Medical School, 131 Misc.
395, 226 N.Y. Supp. 617 (1928) asserting the New York rule that the limitation
provision on death actions is of the same nature as those in the general statute of
limitations; cf. City of Houston v. Chapman, 132 Tex. 443, 123 SAV. 2d 652
(1939); Town of Oneida v. Hail, 21 Tenn. App. 70, 105 S.W. 2d 121 (1937),
where it did not appear whether or not the limitation was under the general statute.
116 Pleading, supra note, 1 at 937.
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greater uniformity in the procedural treatment of time limitations gener-
ally--a desirable goal in itself although it is possible too late to attain
this in the course of judicial, as distinguished from, legislative
development.1 1
7
117 See Atkinson, Some Procedural Aspects of the Statute of Limitations,
27 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1927) indicating general absence of uniformity in the
English law.
